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1  Introduction
The results of post-apartheid land reform in South Africa, especially in 
terms of re-distribution of land for agricultural purposes, have for a substantial 
period of time prompted scholars both inside and outside the legal field to 
ask key questions about the actual ability of law to achieve social change. 
Change in this case translating into an equal, based on race, distribution 
of agricultural land and in turn the role of the distribution of such land in 
combating poverty. With the imminence of the centenary of the notorious 
Native Land Act 27 of 1913,1 which dispossessed millions2 of black South 
Africans, issues of land reform are contentious and high on the agendas of 
both the government and civil society.3 Currently most of the deadlock in 
implementing and rejuvenating the existing reforms is linked to the perceived 
limitations within the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the 
Constitution”) itself and the apparent difficulties in amending it, as further 
discussed below. Therefore, one possible, alternative, way of rectifying 
the massive inequalities in the distribution of agricultural land is to try to 
fashion new discourses, which could expand the state’s ability to undertake 
the necessary reforms. This article sets out to explore what appears to be one 
such (new) discourse focusing on how the concept of state sovereignty can be 
used or misused, defined or re-defined to suit the determinations of a state, 
such as South Africa, in agrarian reform.4 This article emphasises the possible 
links between different theories on state sovereignty (internal and external) 
and agrarian reform for agricultural purposes; and the way in which the idea 
of state sovereignty can act as a vehicle for hard-line agrarian reform when 
1 Also known as the Black Land Act
2 It is difficult to find a full account of the scale of state sanctioned land dispossession that took place under 
the racist regimes in South Africa  However, it has been estimated that more than 3 5 million people were 
dispossessed between 1960 and 1983  See L Platzky & C Walker The Surplus People (1985) 8-12  
3 C Walker “Delivery and Disarray: The Multiple Meaning of Land Restitution” in S Buhlungu, J Daniel, 
R Southall & J Lutchman (eds) State of the Nation South Africa 2005-2006 (2006) 83
4 The term agrarian reform or agrarianism means political proposals for land redistribution, specially 
the re-distribution of land from the land-owning to the landless  This terminology is common in many 
countries, and originates from the Lex Sempronia Agraria or agrarian laws of Rome in 133 BC, imposed 
by Tiberius Gracchus, who seized the lands of the rich and distributed them to the poor  This definition 
of agrarianism is commonly known as “agrarian reform”  See H Scullard From the Gracchi to Nero: 
A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D.68 2 ed (1963) 23
       
all else appears to have failed. This article furthermore attempts to highlight 
some alternative avenues in constitutional interpretation to furnish new routes 
out of the current stalemate; focusing on remedies which currently are under-
explored and deserve more scholarly attention.
Presently the greatest controversy exists around the issues of nationalisation 
of land and the position of the willing-buyer/willing-seller (“WBWS”) 
principle within the ambit of the expropriation clause in section 25(2)-(4) of 
the Constitution, going forward. These issues are interlinked, and they are 
furthermore closely related to state sovereignty as will be further discussed 
below. With regard to the WBWS principle and what Lahiff refers to as a 
“market-assisted agrarian reform”5, arguments have been forwarded both 
for and against the usefulness of this policy6 as introduced by the African 
National Congress (“ANC”) in the 1997 White Paper on South African Land 
Policy.7 Without having to further engage with this discussion it is clear from 
recent statements that the government is looking for a reasonable alternative 
to the WBWS principle in order to be in a position of actually promoting 
redistribution of land and the socio-economic right to property put forward 
in, for example section 25(5) of the Constitution.8 This section stipulates a 
socio-economic right to property requiring the state to implement measures 
aimed at achieving land redistribution.9 In a statement made by the Minister 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, at the Agri-SA policy conference in 
Stellenbosch earlier this year, the Minister proposed that “an alternative had 
to be found to WBWS principle if the land reform question is to be resolved”.10
The hypothesis that has guided the analysis as presented below is that 
a narrow interpretation of section 25 of the Constitution, as reinforced by 
government policy, cannot support the type of agrarian reform that the 
government needs to introduce to address the underperformance of current 
systems in place to reach the target of redistributing 24.9 million hectares to 
the black majority by 2014.11 As concluded by Ntsebeza:
5 E Lahiff “‘Willing Buyer, Willing Seller’: South Africa’s Failed Experiment in Market Led Agrarian 
Reform” (2007) 28 TWQ 1577 1577
6 See for example Lahiff (2007) TWQ 1580 and L Ntsebeza “Land Redistribution in South Africa: The 
Property Clause Revisited” in L Ntsebeza & R Hall (eds) The Land Question in South Africa: The 
Challenge of Transformation and Redistribution (2007) 120  
7 Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997)
8 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) para 19
9 The socio-economic right to property is premised on the argument that all people have a moral right 
to have at least enough property to enable them to survive or to lead a dignified existence  This means 
that if they do not have property, it should be provided for them, usually by the state  This claim would 
make the constitutional property right a socio-economic right  See I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of 
Rights Handbook (2005) 534-535  See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 80-81
10 Legal Resource Centre “Land Reform Issue Hots Up” (29-02-2012) LRC <http://www lrc org za/other-
news/1800-2012-03-05-land-reform-issue-hots-up> (accessed 01-03-2012)
11 The long-standing target for land transfer under all aspects of the land reform programme is 24 9 million 
hectares by 2014, equivalent to 30% of white-owned agricultural land in 1994, estimated at 83 million 
hectares  E Lahiff Land Reform in South Africa: A Status Report Research Report 38 (01-07-2008) <http://
www plaas org za/plaas-publication/rr-38> (accessed 15-03-2012)
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“There is a fundamental contradiction in the South African Constitution’s commitment to fundamental 
land redistribution to the dispossessed while at the same time protecting existing property rights. The 
two … cannot happen at the same time.”12
Currently, there is a strong focus on private ownership by the strict use of 
expropriation in relation to the WBWS principle in government policy. The 
calculation of compensation with regard to the expropriation for the purpose of 
land reform (public purpose) has underscored government’s policy and made 
large scale land re-distribution more or less impossible. At the same time, 
expropriation with less compensation (than market value) and deprivation, 
without compensation for socio-economic purposes (a wider interpretation of 
section 25) to foster equal land ownership in South Africa as spelled out, for 
example, in section 25(5) has not been sufficiently explored and utilised.
Furthermore, related to the necessity of a wider interpretation of section 25, 
is the urgent need for policy, and more importantly, legislation, built on 
innovative and alternative interpretations of sections 8, 25, 36 and 39 of the 
Constitution that would enable the state to exit the deadlock it is currently 
facing. This article will argue that contrary to the views expressed in recent 
policy there is no need to resort to discourses which would attempt to 
circumvent the Constitution and favour complete nationalisation of land to 
achieve successful re-distribution of agricultural land. There is, furthermore, 
no need for constitutional amendments, as already suggested by Hall, as the 
Constitution itself opens up for a number of solutions if there is a political will 
to explore them.13
The analysis of the above hypothesis has to take place within the existing 
legal framework, the historical context of land in South Africa, the current 
position of the state in terms of land possession and most importantly the 
enormous need for resources of the overwhelming majority of South Africans. 
At present the government claims14 to control between 5-7% or about two 
million hectares agricultural land, which is too little to make an impact by 
transferring state-owned land as part of the redistribution scheme.15 At the 
same time the government does not have the budget to expropriate agricultural 
land under the sometimes extorted and misused WBWS principle.
Furthermore, South Africa has the ability to be self-sufficient in virtually 
all major agricultural products and is currently a net food exporter.16 Hence, 
farming remains vitally important to the economy and importantly the 
12 Ntsebeza “Land Redistribution in South Africa: The Property Clause Revisited” in The Land Question in 
South Africa 108
13 R Hall “Land Restitution in South Africa: Rights, Development, and the Restrained State” (2004) 38 
CJAS 654 661
14 The land audit as carried out by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform through the 
Chief Surveyor-General is yet to be finalised and the results to be published  In media statements by the 
Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform, Mr Nkwinti, and Agriculture Minister, Ms Joemat-
Pettersen, it has been held that the audit will be completed by December 2012  See for example N Tolsi 
“ANC Introduces New Policy on Land Restitution” (30-06-2009) Mail & Guardian Online <http://mg co
za/article/2012-06-30-anc-introduces-its-new-policy-on-land-reform> (accessed 21-08-2012)
15 Y Groenewald “Who Owns What Land in South Africa?” (23-01-2009) Mail & Guardian Online <http://
mg co za/article/2009-01-23-who-owns-what-land-in-south-africa> (accessed 15-03-2012)  
16 The Republic of South Africa South Africa Yearbook 2008/2009: Agriculture & Land Affairs (2009) 47
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development of the larger southern African region.17 The government is 
therefore faced with a major and quite common dilemma in a post-colonial 
sub-Saharan context: how to design/re-design land reform to radically and 
rapidly break from the colonial (and apartheid) past without significantly 
disrupting agricultural production and food security. The real challenge is 
that any reform has to fit within the negotiated and politically motivated realm 
of the Constitution. It attempts to both protect private ownership through the 
prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of property and achieve equality in 
land by promoting land re-distribution through legislation in section 25(5).
To set the parameters for this critical discussion the analysis in this article 
departs from the most recent policy statement of the South African government 
on land reform, the Green Paper on Land Reform of 201118 (“Green Paper”). 
The controversy surrounding current land reform and its results sets the stage 
for a number of different interpretations of the contents and intentions behind 
this new policy and its possible implications for the constitutional protection 
of private ownership as well as the necessity of this drastic change of course. 
Within the ambit of this article, this policy statement will be used to explore 
possible connections between government policy, internal/external sovereignty 
and agrarian reform to reveal the contradictions that might follow when the 
idea of state sovereignty is superimposed over the Constitution to allow the 
government to gain greater control over land for purposes of agrarian reform 
instead of using a wider, permissible, interpretation of the Constitution.
At the moment the government is considering a number of different options, 
as is visible in the Green Paper, to reach its 2014 target. The discussions 
around the formulation of the new policy as put forward in the Green Paper 
have revealed that the government is understandably reluctant to engage in 
direct changes to the Constitution. To try to amend section 25(2)-(4) of the 
Constitution to curtail the expropriation clause and make land transfer easier 
and less expensive is a cumbersome and time consuming task requiring 
sufficient support in Parliament.19 Furthermore, any change to the Bill of 
Rights is likely to face great resistance from civil society, the opposition 
parties, local and foreign investors, international donors and the international 
community over all.
Thus, one of the other options considered, as discussed in the Green 
Paper, would be to try to re-define the state’s power over land through the 
concept of sovereignty to completely change the point of departure of all land 
reform. In other words, not departing from reverting private ownership as it is 
protected by the Constitution, but in the name of colonialism “repossess land 
 
17 The Republic of South Africa South Africa Yearbook 2010/2011: Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(2011) 38
18 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Green Paper on Land Reform (2011)
19 To amend a section in the Bill of Rights a Bill suggesting such an amendment would have to be passed 
by the National Assembly with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members and by the 
National Council of Provinces with a supporting vote of at least six out of nine provinces (s 74(2) of the 
Constitution)  
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lost through force or deceit”20 as part of the state’s direct prerogative based 
on sovereignty. This option would drastically side-step the Constitution and 
radically increases state power over land notwithstanding the Constitution. It 
is this underlying strategy, or simply the state’s view on its entitlement to land 
based on various aspects of sovereignty as put forward in the Green Paper, 
that this paper aims at analysing. Essentially, the key issue is, in light of the 
apparent dysfunction of the current strategy, what new notion the government 
will ascribe to in presenting further policy and, finally, new legislation.
2  The compromise and its impact
As has been repeated many times, South Africa is blessed with a 
representative democracy resting on the transformative values of a progressive 
Constitution including an extensive Bill of Rights. Of great importance to the 
development of agrarian land reform in post-Apartheid South Africa is the 
compromise struck between the National Party (“NP”) and the ANC with 
regards to property during the negotiations leading up to the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (the “interim Constitution”). It 
is widely accepted that section 28 of the interim Constitution (the predecessor 
to section 25 of the 1996 Constitution) represented a concession between ANC 
and NP positions. As a consequence, a fundamental tension exists within this 
section arising out of the constitutional protection of existing property rights 
(at the end of Apartheid) while at the same time indicating a commitment to 
expropriate land “for public purpose” to undertake agrarian reform.21 Hence, 
the interim Constitution and the Constitution clearly protect existing property 
rights while at the same time offering the opportunity of expropriation of land 
with compensation as well as catering for extensive land reform.
One of the earliest and most known interpretations of the property clause 
in the interim Constitution is the one put forward by Chaskalson; which in 
hindsight appears to have been a very optimistic interpretation. According 
to him, section 28(2) read with section 28(3) “set up a distinction between 
deprivation of rights in property and expropriation of rights in property”.22 
The former was to be performed “in accordance with law”23 while for 
expropriation there were two added requirements, “the expropriation 
had to be performed pursuant to a public purpose and had to be followed 
by the payment of compensation”.24 The ANC, according to Chaskalson, 
understood the inclusion of section 28(2) to mean that, “in the absence of 
an expropriation, compensation need not be paid to a party deprived of 
property rights by state action”.25 Chaskalson’s optimism seems to have been 
based on his understanding and interpretation of the compromise reached in 
20 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Green Paper on Land Reform 1
21 Ntsebeza “Land Redistribution in South Africa: The Property Clause Revisited” in The Land Question in 
South Africa 115
22 M Chaskalson “Stumbling Towards Section 28: Negotiations Over the Protection of Property Rights in 
the Interim Constitution” (1995) 11 SAJHR 222 236
23 236
24 236
25 236
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the negotiations between the NP and the ANC. Although agreeing that the 
wording of section 28 was “not always clear”,26 he imagined that the courts 
“would do well to adopt a purposive approach” in interpreting this section 
(and later section 25), bearing “in mind the compromise which the section” 
sought to achieve.27 Drawing from comparative legal history, Chaskalson 
concluded that if courts were “overzealous in their protection of property 
rights … the potential for constitutional conflict between court and state will 
be substantial”.28 He also on this point argued, correctly, that given that “any 
substantial land reform programme is likely to depend on expropriation … 
land reform could be rendered constitutionally impossible”.29 It is evident by 
the language used in the Green Paper that it is at this point of constitutional 
impossibility that the government finds itself at present.
Having due regard to the compromise struck in 1993 it becomes inherently 
difficult to argue that land reform should take place strictly within the ambit 
of the Constitution. The reality is that if the Constitution is interpreted in a 
narrow way, land reform as it was envisaged by the ANC in 1993 is rendered 
almost impossible. The question that then remains is how to balance the idea 
of the compromise (in hindsight not fully accommodated in the interim and 
final Constitutions) with the current instructions of the Constitution, the 
apparent need for agrarian reform as well as the continuance of agricultural 
production and food security; and furthermore how to solve this problem 
without plunging the country into financial pandemonium by disrupting its 
vital agricultural production and scaring off international investments. The 
Green Paper, being an initial policy document, only presents us with a few, 
quite vague, answers to the important questions posed above. In addition it 
creates a number of pertinent issues (not all of them addressed in this paper) 
that might seem inherently political, but that have great bearing on key legal 
concepts that need to be addressed in order to create legal certainty as a basis 
for successful land reform.
3  The Green Paper: Is national sovereignty defined in terms of 
land?
On 31 August 2011, the long-overdue Green Paper was published by the 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (“the Department”) 
to set in motion a consultation process on the contents of the Green Paper 
across the country. Even though the Green Paper should only be regarded as a 
tentative government report on policy within the area of land reform without 
any specific commitment to action, it is an important first step in reviewing 
the existing structures to finally propose new legislation or change existing 
laws. The review is focusing on the policy statements of the 1997 White 
26 M Chaskalson “The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution” (1994) 10 SAJHR 131 139
27 139.
28 139.
29 136-137
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Paper30 as well as other programmes and products of the, then, Department 
of Land Affairs.
The main objective of the Green Paper is to set in motion a new trajectory 
for land reform and accordingly a set of proposals were put forward which, 
in the words of the Department, “attempts to break from the past without 
significantly disrupting agricultural production and food security, and avoid 
redistributions that do not generate livelihoods, employment and incomes”.31 
This trajectory is, as is evident in the eleven page long Green Paper, set within 
strict, politically motivated values which sharply deviate from the backbone 
of the new constitutionally driven South Africa – powered, not discouraged, 
by the Truth and Reconciliation Process. The tone is set by the statement in 
the introduction of the Green paper spelling out that:
“The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the TRC) has adequately demonstrated the capacity and 
political will of black people, in general, and the African majority, in particular, to forgive. BUT, this 
goodwill should not be taken for granted, because it is not an inexhaustible social asset. It is an asset 
around which we should work together to build our collective future. That is the spirit of this Draft 
Green Paper.”32
The Green Paper has been presented as a constructive foundation for 
further discussions while at the same time highlighting the government’s 
political agenda. A balancing act that may prove to be far more difficult than 
previously, considering the heightened attention given to land as a means not 
only for development but also for liberation. The “land issue” is described 
in the Green Paper as the battleground of socio-economic equality and the 
means with which a new cultural hegemony can be established. Even though 
the substance of the Green Paper is inherently political and very much 
emotional, it serves to inform South Africa’s legislative future in terms of 
ownership, food production and combating poverty. It is therefore important 
to scrutinise and debate, from a legal perspective, the points of departure that 
the government has chosen for this exercise; points of departure, as argued in 
this article, that may prove to be counterproductive and create division instead 
of the unity that is advocated within the founding document of the nation, 
the Constitution.33 It is apparent from the strategy and language used in the 
Green Paper, as discussed further below, that the new path of land reform is 
not exclusively dependent on the Constitution. It is aimed at once and for all 
changing the paradigm that has previously informed land and agrarian reform 
in South Africa. It also seems like land reform is no longer viewed as an 
inherently peaceful and transformative process but as an anti-colonial struggle 
where repossession of land lost through force or deceit and the restoring of 
indigenous culture are at the forefront.34 In reality, the constitutional mould, 
30 Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy
31 G Nkwinti “Media Statement on the Green Paper on Land Reform 31 Aug 2011” (31-08-2011) Department 
of Rural Development and Land Reform <http://www ruraldevelopment gov za/DLA-Internet/content/
news/GreenPaperMediaStatement jsp> (accessed 15-03-2012)
32 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Green Paper on Land Reform 3
33 Preamble of the Constitution
34 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Green Paper on Land Reform 1
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in the narrow sense, cannot expedite the promises of the ANC government, so 
what will be the way forward?
The essential idea behind the Green Paper, as with any policy document, is 
that it should form a critical part of the debate on how to move forward with 
regards to agrarian reform. In the words of the Minister:
“We must, as a nation be open to robust debate, so as to emerge with a way forward for land reform, 
that will ensure a better life for all.”35
The point of departure of this paper is to question the underlying idea of 
the Green Paper to put nationalisation of land as an asset or, as it is indicated 
in the Green paper, to view land as a national asset at the forefront of this 
“robust” discussion. The most crucial issue is the introductory statement in 
the Green Paper that spells out that:
“National sovereignty is defined in terms of land. Even without it being enshrined in the country’s 
supreme law, the Constitution, land is a national asset. This is where the debate about agrarian change, 
land reform and rural development should, appropriately, begin. Without this fundamental assumption, 
talk of effective land reform and food sovereignty and security is superfluous!”36
It further goes on by indicating that:
“All anti-colonial struggles are, at the core, about two things: repossession of land lost through force 
or deceit; and restoring the centrality of indigenous culture.”37
These statements both highlight and complicate the ambivalent compromise 
struck between the ANC and NP at the advent of the interim Constitution, 
as discussed above, that envisaged a transformation of land distribution but 
never at the cost of any unconstitutional infringements of the protection of 
private ownership; that is to say, recognising and entrenching land rights 
acquired through colonialism and apartheid.38 It is quite clear that the new 
policy takes focus off the apparent failure of the government to reach the 
targets set with regards to land reform and frames the current problems 
as a struggle against colonialism – not as a struggle against corruption, 
mismanagement or breakdown of the current systems and strategies for land 
reform. Even if it is easy to conclude that the root of the extremely uneven 
land distribution in South Africa is the massive dispossession and relocation 
of black South Africans during colonial and apartheid rule, the value of this 
rationale in solving the current crisis in land reform it questionable. These 
statements further contradict the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society 
that the Constitution sets out in, for example, sections 9, 30 and 31, not only 
highlighting the importance of indigenous culture but leaving room for all 
cultures and cultural expressions to thrive in South Africa within the ambit of 
the Bill of Rights.
Put in the context of colonialism, the suggestions of a new cultural 
hegemony and the centrality of indigenous culture as brought forward in 
35 G Nkwinti “Media Statement on the Green Paper on Land Reform 31 Aug 2011” Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform
36 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Green Paper on Land Reform 1
37 1
38 Ntsebeza “Land Redistribution in South Africa: The Property Clause Revisited” in The Land Question in 
South Africa 113  
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the Green Paper makes it possible to question whether the government has 
perhaps, willingly or by mistake, mixed up the ideas of authority over land 
externally and internally. Traditionally, internal sovereignty is limited by 
the founding agreement (in a democratic state), different from the concept of 
sovereignty with regard to totalitarian rule where authority over land externally 
and internally would grant the state the right to full control, ie disregarding 
private ownership if necessary. The above statements could be an indication 
that the government is intending to use, as will be further discussed below, the 
concepts of sovereignty and colonialism to construe a new baseline that would 
allow it to regard all land as an asset already belonging to the state. In other 
words, either misconstruing the concept of external and internal sovereignty 
or moving towards totalitarian rule in disregarding the Constitution. This 
might be regarded as a subtle shift or a rhetoric issue but the consequences of 
this shift, it is argued below, will not be subtle but rather a great leap toward a 
new paradigm in agrarian reform.
The “national asset” statement should furthermore be viewed in the context 
of the discussions that took place before the Green Paper was made official. 
In the first draft proposal that was made public in 2010 it was suggested 
by the Minister that “all productive land” should be turned into a “national 
asset” by amending the Constitution and that the land then should be leased 
back to the farmers.39 This naturally sparked an intense debate between 
the government, the farming community, civil society organisations and 
international investors fearing that they would lose what they had already 
invested in. Another option mooted was to retain the current freehold tenure 
system but impose a ceiling on the number or size of landholdings owned 
by individual farmers. From this perspective the new policy statement in 
the Green Paper is a direct attempt to de-link the nationalisation idea from 
productive farm land to avoid (international) criticism but at the same time 
indirectly retain the same (widened) prerogative by declaring “all land” and 
not only “all productive land” a national asset. Even though it might not, in 
general, be possible to draw a direct link between the idea of land as a national 
asset and nationalisation of land the discussion prevailing in the Green Paper 
clearly revealed the intentions of the government in this regard.
From this new point of departure it will be much easier for the ANC 
government to argue greater rights of the state to interfere with private 
ownership since the new theory seems to be based on an inherent right of 
the state to all land regardless of its status and the rights and duties under the 
Constitution. Furthermore, instead of having to go through the cumbersome 
and perhaps impossible process of amending section 25 of the Constitution, 
using the procedure as spelled out in section 74, and having to take cognisance 
of the views of the opposition and civil society, the government seems to be 
opening a door towards circumventing the Constitution by re-interpreting the 
concept of sovereignty. However, it is submitted that it is a misconception to 
regard national sovereignty as defined by the possession of land rather than 
39 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Strategic Plan 2010-2013 (2010) 11 <http://www
info gov za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=123854> (accessed 12-03-2012)
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the authority over territory. This misconception relies in part on the classical 
concept of equal sovereignty as it is defined in international law and its close 
relationship with the issue of statehood which in turn embraces the ideas of 
territory, population, government, capacity to act, state recognition and the 
respect for basic human rights. There can be no state without a territory ie 
land (and waters) under the jurisdiction of a government. But as much at the 
concept of sovereignty in international law relies on the notion of territory 
it does not indicate how the state should hold its territory, ie how it should 
express its authority over it. This is in most jurisdictions left to be defined in 
the founding agreement or the Constitution of the state.
4  The international doctrine of equal sovereignty, statehood 
and its reliance on territory
The concept of sovereignty is introduced in the initial statement of the Green 
Paper as outlined above. The statement of the government that “[n]ational 
sovereignty is defined in land” and that based on this “land is a national asset” 
necessitates a further discussion about the difference between the notion 
of internal and external sovereignty; where the external or international 
sovereignty is much more relying on land or territory as a base of exercising 
power/authority. To understand the concept of sovereignty and moreover 
to understand how the concept of national sovereignty as it is generally 
understood differs from the concept used in the argument put forward by 
the policy makers in the Green Paper, this article introduces and explains 
the notion of the equal sovereignty of all states (external or international 
sovereignty) and related concepts such as statehood and state recognition 
under international law. It highlights how these concepts relate to, but differ 
from, national sovereignty and how land plays a very different role in defining 
national sovereignty compared to the role land or territory (as the term used in 
international law and in this section used inter-changeably) plays in outlining 
the powers of the state. To put it simply and perhaps in too general terms, 
power over territory defines power in interstate relations to a great extent, ie 
in interstate relations sovereignty is largely (but not exclusively) defined in 
terms of power over territory. However, as further discussed below in internal 
affairs, national sovereignty can be defined as the ability of governments to 
exercise unilateral control over their policy instruments and the issues that are 
important to them, and to operate without outside influence in their internal 
affairs. The first feature reflects the extent to which a government can dictate 
the outcomes over the things it cares about, and the second feature reflects 
the extent that a government is free to determine its own affairs when other 
governments are indifferent to its choices.40 Departing from this definition it 
is possible, as will be further argued below, to separate authority from control 
and sovereignty from land monopoly.
40 K Bagwell & R Staiger “National Sovereignty in an Interdependent World” (2003) IDEAS: Economic and 
Finance Research 1 <http://www ssc wisc edu/econ/archive/wp2003-27 pdf> (accessed 15-03-2012)
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In international relations and under international law territory gives the 
state entity the right to act within the international community if it fulfils the 
criteria of statehood as discussed below. In contrast, internal sovereignty in 
a modern democratic state, such as South Africa, would allow the state to 
express authority over its territory and govern within its jurisdiction but only 
as far as the Constitution allows and without confusing this with actual land 
possession or ownership. It could of course possess some land in terms of pure 
ownership. But would, to a great extent, allow different parties to own and use 
land for different purposes. This would not contravene the safety and security 
of the state. The usage and ownership of land could be for the greater good 
of the individual, group or enterprise and for the greater good of the state in 
ensuring investments (foreign and domestic), food security and the support of 
functioning taxation strategy as a model of redistribution of wealth. Power, as 
within international law, would not from an internal perspective have to be 
rooted in the notion that the state is the almighty ruler over its territory. It has 
the power and authority to act within its land but in a true democratic state 
there would be limitations on the state’s capacity to act and also, it is submitted 
below, to own, possess or express power over land. In the case of South Africa 
these limitations are clearly expressed in section 25. It is, therefore, a fruitless 
exercise to try to argue, as is done in the Green Paper, that national sovereignty 
should be defined in terms of land and that even though land is not described 
as a national asset in the Constitution all of it could be regarded as a national 
asset to the extent that it would circumvent section 25.
Under international law the principle of the equal sovereignty of all states 
is a fundamental principle underlying the whole notion of the international 
community and having universal relevance.41 The international community 
is not homogenous and therefore fundamental principles such as the 
principle of the equal sovereignty of all states serves as a common core, a 
point of departure for all international law and all international relations. 
Considering that there is no international constitution guiding the welfare of 
the international community as a whole, basic principles such as the principle 
of equal sovereignty of all states assume the role of guiding policy, aiding in 
the interpretation of law, filling gaps in legislation and constructing new legal 
provisions in international law. Principles of this nature are found both in 
international customary law and in international treaty law.
The concept of equal sovereignty in international law is put forward as a 
rule of international law in article 2(1) of the UN Charter42 stating that “[t]
he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members”. The contents and context of this principle was further defined 
in the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations43 in 1970 indicating that “the territorial integrity and 
41 A Cassese International Law 2 ed (2005) 48
42 Charter of the United Nations (1945) 1 UNTS XVI
43 UN General Assembly Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970) Resolution 
2625 (XXV) (A/8082)
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political independence of the state are inviolable”.44 It is clear from this 
statement that the territory of the state is important and the importance and 
position of territory becomes even more evident once the principle of equal 
sovereignty of all states is reflected against the conditions of statehood and its 
relationship with the recognition of states. For an entity to become a state it 
needs to be able to fit into the mould of statehood; this mould or concept gives 
us a very good idea of the importance of territory as a base for state power in 
external and, to a certain extent, internal affairs.45 As is argued below, internal 
safety and security conditions forces the state to take authority over territory 
just as it does in international law but for the sake of modern international law 
territory is viewed as either being controlled or not controlled by the authority 
of the state. It does not prescribe that the state has to control the territory in 
terms of ownership or as an asset belonging to the state.
In medieval times the European ruler of the land was also the “owner” 
who allocated the land to whom he or she saw fit. The early Westphalian 
concept of state sovereignty was very closely related to the actual possession 
of territory.46 However, what we would regard as control over territory in 
terms of sovereignty both internally and externally should today, within 
modern international law, not be confused with possession of territory as the 
classic concept of equal sovereignty would have indicated. Under modern 
international law state territory can be defined as: “That defined portion of 
the surface of the globe which is subject to the sovereignty of the state”.47 A 
state without territory is not possible, although the necessary territory may be 
very small. The importance of state territory lies in the fact that it is the space 
within which the state exercises its “supreme authority”.48 The Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States49 (“Montevideo Convention”), 
states in article 1 that:
“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent 
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the 
other states.”
The territorial sovereignty extends to: the designated landmass, the subsoil, 
the water enclosed therein, the land under that water, the seacoast (territorial 
sea) up to a maximum of twelve nautical miles and the airspace over the 
landmass (exact limit not yet established) and the territorial sea.50 In terms of 
the territorial sovereignty as a concept of modern international law article 1(b) 
and (c) of the Montevideo Convention would be considered as more important 
in determining the relevance of territory to the sovereign capacity of the 
state. With regards to the territory of the state it is adequate to indicate that 
in international terms there is no minimum size of what can be regarded as a 
state. The states borders do not have to be precisely defined, as for example 
44 Para 1
45 J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 4 ed (2011) 81-86
46 F Ganshof Feudalism 3 ed (1976)  
47 LFL Oppenheim International Law 8 ed (1955) 451-452
48 452
49 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) 165 LNTS 19
50 R Wallace & O Martin-Ortega International Law 6 ed (2009) 100-101
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with the state of Israel; however, there has to be an effective and continuous 
control over the territory. Furthermore, territorial sovereignty presupposes 
a positive obligation to protect the population of the state. In terms of the 
government it needs to be effective in the sense that it has effective control 
over the territory; that it is independent of other authorities; and that it enjoys 
legislative and administrative competence.51
Territory is important but the connection in terms of external sovereignty 
is authority and not actual possession. From this perspective it is interesting 
to further explore the concept of national sovereignty. The Green Paper has 
left us with two main questions. Firstly, whether national sovereignty really 
is defined in land; and secondly whether this gives the state (in this case the 
South African government) the right to regard land as an asset of the state 
to ease nationalisation even though the Constitution may contradict this? 
As with the discussion about equal sovereignty the aim is not to produce a 
definition which would satisfy all the requirements of any fields of knowledge 
that would be involved with this issue. It is enough to say that lawyers and 
political scientists, to name but two fields, would sometimes have different 
views on some of these fundamental concepts.
With sovereignty meaning holding supreme, autonomous authority over a 
state, as discussed above, internal (national) sovereignty refers to the internal 
affairs of the state and the positioning of supreme power within it.52 National 
sovereignty could, for the purpose of this article, be defined as indicating that 
sovereignty belongs to and derives from the state, an abstract entity normally 
linked to a physical territory (as defined under international law) and its past, 
present and future citizens. It is undoubtedly an ideological concept derived 
from liberal political theory. It traces back to Locke in the late seventeenth 
century and to Montesquieu in eighteenth century France.53 Under the concept 
of national sovereignty, the state is regarded as superior to the individuals 
of whom it is composed. National sovereignty can be contrasted, on the one 
hand, to absolutism and to other doctrines that see sovereignty as residing 
solely in a monarch, aristocracy, theocracy or other small elite (classic notion 
in international law),54 and on the other hand to popular or representative 
sovereignty,55 which has more egalitarian implications as in the South African 
case (modern notion in international law).
The first real application of the idea of national sovereignty was in the 
constitutions of the French Revolution (1789–1799). National sovereignty 
was conceived as indivisible and inalienable, not simply parcelled out among 
individuals or any other units who formed the nation. The French Revolution 
was explicitly national, based on the concept of a nation state whose interests 
took precedence over those of individuals, even while guaranteeing rights to 
individuals. Article 3 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen declared explicitly that “all sovereignty resides essentially in 
51 Dugard International Law 83
52 A Heywood Political Theory 3 ed (2004) 92-94
53 P Manent An Intellectual History of Liberalism (1995) 39-44, 54-55
54 See for example the Danish Kongeloven (Lex Regia) from 1665  
55 E Morgan Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (1988) 22
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the nation”.56 Therefore, internal (national) sovereignty could be explained 
as the relationship between a sovereign power and its own subjects. A central 
concern was legitimacy; in other words, what gave the government the right 
to exercise authority. Claims of legitimacy might refer to the divine right of 
kings or to a social contract (ie popular sovereignty). In classical political 
theory, national sovereignty translates into a representative constitutional 
system, because a nation cannot be governed by direct democracy, given the 
impossibility of direct representation of its past and future citizens. The simple 
majority of the residents of the territory of a nation, or even of its citizens, is 
not necessarily considered identical to the will of the nation. However, a state 
that has national sovereignty is one with a government that has been elected 
by its people, that therefore enjoys popular legitimacy but only within the 
scope of the founding document that limits the powers of the state vis-à-vis its 
citizens and structures certain basic rights.
5  Reference to colonial legacy
From the discussion above it is quite clear that the South African government 
is venturing down a precarious road in trying to convince the public that it 
has an overarching right to super-impose its power over land based on the 
concept of national sovereignty. To legitimise its increased powers over 
land, as discussed above, it uses a continuum of phrases all referring back 
to South Africa’s troubled past. The relevant issues at hand are whether 
today’s agrarian reform is at all an anti-colonial struggle and if the oppressive 
colonial history of South Africa could really legitimise the disregard of the 
Constitution with regards to agrarian reform and nationalisation of land as the 
Green Paper seems to suggest. As indicated in the Green Paper, the strategy 
of the Department is “Agrarian Transformation” which is interpreted to mean 
“a rapid and fundamental change in the relations (systems and patterns of 
ownership and control) of land, livestock, cropping and community”.57 The 
goal of this strategy is to attain “social cohesion and development”.58 This 
strategy is framed by the Department as an “on-going anti-colonial struggle” 
which is at the core about “repossessing land lost through force and deceit and 
restoring the centrality of indigenous culture”,59 as mentioned above.
The relevant questions are whether we can and should understand land 
reform as an on-going “colonial struggle” in present day South Africa and, if 
so, how do we frame this discussion within the objective, as put forward by 
the government, to “restore the centrality of indigenous culture”? Perhaps it 
would have been more helpful if the Green Paper would have re-phrased the 
“colonial struggle” to a struggle against the inequalities in land possession 
as created during colonialism and Apartheid. In the racially segregated 
and charged South Africa of today it is of great value to try to separate the 
systems created and converted from the people creating and engaging with 
56 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789)
57 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Green Paper on Land Reform 1
58 1
59 1
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them. It would furthermore have been useful if the Green Paper had related 
to the many current problems and general policy weaknesses that need to 
be combated to make any agrarian reform successful in South Africa. An 
attempt of this nature was made in a short presentation by the Department 
to the public on 25 of August 2011 where the following weaknesses and 
contributing factors to the failure of the current policy were pointed out: Land 
acquisition strategy/WBWS – a distorted land market; fragmented beneficiary 
support; beneficiary selection for land redistribution; land administration/
governance – especially in communal areas; meeting the 30% redistribution 
target by 2014; declining agricultural contribution to the GDP; unrelenting 
increase in rural unemployment; and, a problematic restitution model and its 
support system (communal property institutions and management).
The same presentation also pointed out the three core principles/objectives 
with the new trajectory of agrarian reform as presented in the Green Paper as 
de-racialisation of the rural economy; democratic and equitable land allocation 
and use across gender, race and class; and strict production discipline for 
guaranteed national food security. If viewed from the perspective of the 
additional information, not part of the government’s official policy, it becomes 
easier to reflect on the suggested remedies as spelled out in the Green Paper, 
namely the repossession of land and restoration of culture. From the problem 
statement above it is quite obvious that the repossession of land and restoration 
of indigenous culture is going to do very little per se in the struggle to tackle 
the problems highlighted above. It is furthermore evident that values and 
guiding principles are not forwarded by branding the new strategy for land 
reform an “anti-colonial struggle”.
Of further interest is what culture is supposed to be restored in the ethnically 
diverse and fragmented South Africa of today? Section 30 of the Constitution 
indicates that everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in 
the cultural life of their choice, section 9 prescribes the right to equality of all 
based on language, culture, religion and ethnicity; and section 31 guarantees 
that everyone has the freedom to enjoy their culture in association with others 
and to express their culture within the realm of the Bill of Rights. The preamble 
to the Constitution frames these rights and freedoms by stating that all who 
live in South Africa are to be united in their diversity. The Minister has on 
several occasions indicated that the Green Paper is to be the point of departure 
for a robust discussion between the government and various stakeholders, as 
discussed above. But if the rhetoric used in the Green Paper does not reflect 
the values of diversity and unity as enshrined in the Constitution, it is not 
likely to be either a useful fundament for meaningful agrarian reform or a 
basis for a robust discussion of future reform.
If judged by the magnitude of the theoretical discussions in the Green 
Paper, a lot of effort has gone into reflecting over South Africa’s past and little 
attention has been given to the idea of trying to move away from the colonial 
genesis. The Green Paper is in this spirit ended with a number of quotes from 
Dube, the founding president of the ANC. In his important critique of racially 
discriminatory laws presented in his testimony to the Natives’ Economic 
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Commission in 1930, Dube expresses that the future for all South Africans 
lies within the land being:
“Purchased for them and handed over; all the African areas ought to be properly surveyed and divided 
into small building plots, grazing grounds and gardens.”60
As indicated in the Green Paper and elsewhere in the government’s 
development policy, small scale, subsistence farming is high on the agenda of 
the ANC government to alleviate poverty, especially in the rural areas. In the 
2009 National Election Manifesto, the ANC identified land reform as being 
one of five priority areas for the coming five years.61 In the manifest the ANC 
took a great step away from the liberal market-led reform that was introduced 
in 1994 towards a land strategy based on the idea “[t]he land shall be shared 
amongst those who work it”!62 Based on the latest ANC manifesto, which to a 
large extent have inspired the Green Paper, agrarian reform should be geared 
towards poverty alleviation and development of the rural areas mainly through 
the support of small scale farming as suggested already by Dube. In the 2009 
National Election Manifesto it is further stated that “[t]he ANC is committed 
to a comprehensive rural development strategy linked to agrarian reform”.63 
The ANC is planning to achieve rural development through the expansion of 
access to food through production schemes in rural and peri-urban areas and 
teaching people how to grow their own food. The government (the ANC and 
government is used interchangeably in the manifesto) will further support 
existing community schemes which utilise land for food production in schools, 
health facilities, churches and urban and traditional authority areas. To make 
land available for this type of small scale and cooperative farming, the ANC 
aims at reviewing the appropriateness of the existing land redistribution 
programme and will introduce measures, such as the ones alluded to above, 
aimed at speeding up the pace of land reform, which will intensify the land 
reform programme, ensuring that more land ends up in the hands of the rural 
poor.
6  Conclusions
From the discussion above it can be concluded that internal and external 
sovereignty are two different concepts which apply in different contexts. 
External sovereignty affords affording the state full powers and a wide margin 
of appreciation within the international domain while most theories would 
regard internal sovereignty in a modern democracy as strictly limited by the 
founding agreement ie the Constitution in the South African case. Territory 
(externally) and land (internally) plays a vital role in relation to both concepts 
but while international law defines possession of territory as an exclusive base 
of power and then adds effective authority and so on, the concept of internal 
60 H Hughes First President: A Life of John L Dube Founding President of the ANC (2011) 244
61 ANC “African National Congress Manifesto Policy Framework” (01-03-2009) ANC 2 <http://www anc
org za/docs/manifesto/2009/policy_frameworkz pdf> (accessed 16-03-2012)
62 South African Congress Alliance The Freedom Charter (1955)
63 ANC “African National Congress Manifesto Policy Framework” ANC 12
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sovereignty replaces actual possession with authority – authority which in 
a representative/popular democracy is limited by the founding agreement. 
The ideas on national sovereignty, as presented above can be used to deduct 
that national sovereignty is the authority of a state (popular sovereignty) to 
govern its population within the ambit given to it by the same. It is argued that 
national sovereignty is defined by the powers given by the people of a state to 
its government – in other words, the authority held by the government in trust 
of its people. This trust would give it the ability to assume jurisdiction and 
act on behalf of the people but in a constitutional democracy the government 
would never have the right to go beyond the Constitution without asking the 
people, in a representative constitutional system such as South Africa, the 
Parliament and the Council of Provinces, to first change the relevant parts of 
the Constitution.
To silence the voices warning the government that strategies that 
arbitrarily deprive individuals of their ownership could constitute a 
violation of the Constitution and as a move away from the nationalisation 
of land; the government in the Green Paper proposes that land should be 
regarded as a national asset because national sovereignty is defined in terms 
of land. This might be a true statement in terms of its external relationship 
with other states within the international community (as discussed above). 
It seems like the government, in this case, is leaning on international legal 
theory which indicates that equal sovereignty of states is closely related 
to the territory of the state and the state’s authority over the territory. 
However, authority over territory should not be confused with the idea of 
monopolising land ownership for purposes of nationalisation. It is possible 
for a state to have authority over its territory without regarding land as a 
national asset, meaning that it belongs in appropriation terms to the state. 
It might even be advisable for the state to strengthen its authority to govern 
(more on this below) by allowing the most efficient individual, serving the 
purposes of the state of production and economic contribution, to own and 
occupy the land. Again it is important to understand the difference between 
internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty and the authority of 
the government to govern its people and assets internally is closely related to 
the objectives of providing for the people and creating a stable environment 
for them to prosper within in accordance with the fundamental rights and 
freedoms as set out in the Constitution. Internal sovereignty is not about 
land as a national asset but about land management. It is quite clear that 
if we attempted to interpret the Constitution it would not define land as a 
national asset on the terms as proposed in the Green Paper; and therefore, as 
a consequence, the point of departure of the government in the Green Paper 
that agrarian change, land reform and rural development should depart from 
the qualification that all land in South Africa is by definition a state asset 
is therefore invalid. Furthermore, the statement of the government that 
“[n]ational sovereignty is defined in land” and that based on this “land is 
a national asset” would even go beyond the interpretation of the interim 
Constitution and later the final Constitution that Chaskalson, as discussed 
above, imagined. This does not mean that the government cannot and should 
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not honour the promise of re-distribution as spelled out in, for example, 
section 25(5) – it must. The problem, however, and this is a serious and 
complex issue, is that the founding agreement, the Constitution, should 
ultimately reflect the will of the majority of South African people and policy 
and legislation put in place should reflect this will. This is not true in terms 
of the first three sections of the property clause in the Constitution and with 
regard to the rigid protection of private property through policy such as the 
WBWS principle. It is difficult for the government to do what it has set out 
to do in the Freedom Charter within the scope of the current Constitution, 
but not impossible as further argued below.
The other side of the coin is, however, the fear that aggressive land reform 
built on a misconstrued idea of state sovereignty and the use of South Africa’s 
colonial past and indigenous rights to justify this would destroy not only the 
fragile democracy of South Africa but would severely hamper the growth of 
South Africa and the ability of many poor South Africans to feed themselves 
to survive. If a government, with reference to national sovereignty, can 
claim control over all land without really considering the position of the 
founding agreement which, in the South African case, represents the 
shift from authoritarian to democratic rule, what would be the difference 
between the colonial state and the democratic state other than the possible 
motivations? Even if the motivations are noble and in line with nationally 
and internationally preferred values of democracy and basic human rights, 
should we go down this avenue considering its possible consequences? 
Agriculture, which is very labour-intensive in South Africa, has been 
pegged by many as a key sector to help create five million jobs by 2020 
but uncertainty has already slowed investment and raised concerns about 
food security.64 Although the government, by leaning on the argument that 
the colonisers destroyed the already existing, flourishing indigenous South 
African farming economy, want more black farmers to emerge, the Green 
Paper paints a bleak future for agriculture in South Africa as the policy does 
not make farming attractive as a career for any (white or black) prospective 
young farmer. Modern agriculture is a risky commercial business and most 
people in South Africa see farming as an industry that supplies food to the 
cities. It is clearly unrealistic to expect masses of people, as is expressed 
in the ANC Manifesto and Green Paper, to go back to farming as a way 
of life. However, if government policy supported agricultural ventures as 
a viable business alternative by refraining from threats of nationalisation 
characterised as part of an anti-colonial struggle, it might achieve the 
objective of maintaining (and even boosting) agricultural production and 
creating food security in South Africa and beyond.
64 W Roelf “SA Struggles to Meet Land Reform Targets” (31-09-2011) Mail & Guardian Online 
<http://mg co za/article/2011-08-31-sa-struggles-to-meet-land-reform-targets> (accessed 16-03-2012)
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Nationalisation of land or viewing the land as a national asset in terms of 
internal sovereignty without regard for the Constitution is not a constructive 
way forward. Social and economic progress or development does not only 
have to be hinged on equality of ownership. The key is to open up more space 
for constitutionally driven land reform and make those who own support 
those who do not, to make those who own generate work under agreeable 
conditions for those who need work, to make those who own generate income 
for the treasury to be re-allocated through working social welfare structures. 
The statement of the current challenges and weaknesses and the rationale for 
change in the presentation by the Department to the public on 25 August was 
right on target in indicating that the problems of the current policy lie within 
a system failure coupled with unrealistic targets. However, these problems 
are not solved by nationalisation or even a nationalisation debate which will 
only serve to weaken South Africa’s position as a trade partner and home for 
investments but through a wider interpretation of section 25(1)-(3). However, 
if the government wants to move towards nationalising the bulk of farm land 
in South Africa, contrary to all the warnings that have been issued, it should 
do so openly and by suggesting a constitutional amendment in accordance 
with section 74 and open up the public room for discussions in this regard. But 
if we take some time to reconsider the thoughts brought forward by, among 
others, Chaskalson and Hall, as alluded to earlier in this article, there is scope 
for a discussion about constitutional land reform within the Constitution itself 
without resorting to the amendment of the Constitution or nationalisation 
as suggested in the Green Paper. The government has previously been very 
creative in its policy statements, coming up with, for example, the WBWS 
principle; and there is a great need for a new analysis of what can be done within 
the realm of the Constitution. The Constitution clearly gives more scope for 
the limitations of private ownership than the interim Constitution, considering 
the fact that section 28(1) spelling out the right for everyone to acquire and 
hold rights in property was not re-established in the Constitution.65 The 
discussion going forward should centre on the possibility of expropriation not 
necessarily linked to market-related compensation (taking into consideration 
that market-related value is but one of the circumstances indicated in section 
25(3)) and/or deprivation of property for re-distribution purposes building on 
the fact that the deprivation has to be brought forward in legislation and the 
non-arbitrariness has to be established. As held by O’Regan J in Mkontwana 
v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality66 alluding to the decision in 
First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank 
v Minister of Finance,67 a court must consider the extent of the deprivation 
and evaluate it in the light of the purpose of the legislation that occasions the 
65 This section could equally be used to argue a weakening of the socio-economic scope of the right for 
everyone to property but this is outside the scope of this article  
66 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 90
67 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100
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deprivation, in order to determine whether there is “sufficient reason” for the 
deprivation.68 O’Regan J goes on by concluding that:
“It should be emphasised, however, that there may be limitations on property rights which are either 
so trivial or are so widely accepted as appropriate in open and democratic societies as not to constitute 
‘deprivations’ for the purposes of section 25(1). This is not a matter which I need to decide for the 
purposes of this case, and it may be left open for further consideration in future.”69
It is in this phrase, where O’Regan J points us in the direction of “wide 
acceptance” that a constructive discussion about land reform without 
constitutional amendment or nationalisation can take its point of departure. 
From this perspective there is a great need for new constructive policy and 
legislation that focuses on the re-distribution and the socio-economic values 
of property. It is submitted that under some circumstances70 deprivation of 
property for purposes that would enhance the fundamental principles of 
equality, freedom and dignity as spelled out in section 39 of the Constitution 
as cornerstones of South Africa’s democracy could fit within the ambit of 
this “wide acceptance” and would not be regarded as arbitrary if spelled out 
in law of general application. This approach would aid the government in 
reaching its goal to re-distribute property on a larger scale, to enable citizens 
to gain access to land on an equitable basis as spelled out in section 25(5) of 
the Constitution.
Furthermore, public purpose or interest related to expropriation as spelled 
out as a necessity in section 25(2) includes the nation’s commitment to land 
reform as indicated in section 25(4). Public purpose and interest must invite 
us to draw equally from the concepts of equality, dignity and freedom as 
spelled out in section 39 of the Constitution, as discussed above. Hence, 
section 25(4)-(9) of the Constitution constitutionalises transformation of the 
property paradigm in South Africa and section 39 instructs any interpretation 
to promote equality, dignity and freedom. It is a powerful statement and it 
is in this interpretation of the expropriation clause together with the use of 
deprivation in some specific cases that the key to successful agrarian reform 
is found; not in a re-definition of national sovereignty or constitutional 
amendment.
68 The meaning of arbitrary in s 25 of the Constitution was determined in First National Bank of SA Limited 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited 
t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC)  Ackermann J concluded that a deprivation of 
property is arbitrary within the meaning of s 25 of the Constitution if the law in issue either fails to 
provide “sufficient reason” for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair  To determine whether there 
is sufficient reason for a permitted deprivation, it is necessary to evaluate the relationship between 
the purpose of the law and the deprivation effected by that law  A complexity of relationships must be 
considered in this assessment including that between the purpose of the provision on the one side, and the 
owner of the property as well as the property itself on the other  If the purpose of the law bears no relation 
to the property and its owner, the provision is arbitrary  The customs law in issue in First National Bank 
of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank 
of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) fell into this category  It permitted 
total deprivation of property even when the customs debt bore no relationship either to the owner or to the 
property itself
69 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 90
70 Taking into account, for example, the history and the acquisition of the property, the historical and current 
use of the property, the size of the property and the potential of the property to fulfill communal needs 
vis-à-vis individual needs
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Finally, with reference to the colonial struggle and the new cultural 
hegemony to be constructed, the root of the many problems facing agrarian 
land reform in South Africa and elsewhere should not be confused with the 
methods of tackling these challenges. It is possible to find many of the causes 
of the present day land crisis in the racist colonial and apartheid structures 
but the methods of solving these issues are not found in an anti-colonial 
struggle. The answer is instead found in the struggle for a comprehensive and 
nuanced re-analysis of the deprivation and expropriation clauses in section 25 
of the Constitution to suit the purposes of re-distribution; as well as focusing 
on combatting corruption and mismanagement of current re-distribution 
schemes and to remedy the apparent lack of funding to monitor a just and 
equitable implementation of the right of all citizens to gain access to land on 
an equitable basis.
SUMMARY
The results of post-apartheid land reform in South Africa have for a substantial period of time 
prompted scholars to ask key questions about the ability of law to achieve social change. Change in 
this case translating into an equal (based on race) distribution of agricultural land and in turn the role 
of the distribution of such land in combating poverty. With the imminence of the centenary of the 
notorious Native Land Act 27 of 1913, which dispossessed millions of black South Africans, issues 
of land reform are contentious and high on the agendas of both the government and civil society. 
Currently most of the deadlock in implementing and rejuvenating the existing reforms is linked to 
the perceived limitations within the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 itself and the 
apparent difficulties in amending it. Therefore, one possible alternative way of rectifying the massive 
inequalities in the distribution of agricultural land is to try to fashion new discourses, which could 
expand the state’s ability to undertake the necessary reforms. This article sets out to explore what 
appears to be one such (new) discourse, as introduced in the Green Paper on Land Reform of 2011, 
focusing on how the concept of state sovereignty can be used or misused, defined or re-defined to suit 
the determinations of a state, such as South Africa, in agrarian reform. This article emphasises the 
possible links between different theories on state sovereignty (internal and external) and agrarian 
reform for agricultural purposes; and the way in which the idea of state sovereignty can act as a vehicle 
for hard-line agrarian reform when all else appears to have failed. This article furthermore attempts 
to highlight some alternative avenues in constitutional interpretation to furnish new routes out of 
the current stalemate; focusing on remedies which currently are under explored and deserve more 
scholarly attention.
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